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Samuel  Paul
Public  accountability  is strengtheaed  when  government  control
(tnonitoring  and  incentive  systems)  is reinforced  by  the public's
willingness  and ability to find alternative  sources of supply
("exit")  or to exert pressure  to perform  ("voice")  - to balance
the phenomenon  of "capture"  (the tendency  of those  who  man-
age  and  control  the  allocation  of public  services  to seek  rents,  not
serve  the public  interest).
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to  enoourage  the  exchange  of idcas  among  Bank  staff and  all  bxhcrs  interested  in developerent  issues  These  papers  carry  the  nmeas  of
the  authors,  rcelct only  ircir views, and  should  he used  and  cited accordingly.  The Efndings,  interpretauons.  and conclusions  are the
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Paul argues that public accountability, a major  performance of public serviees.  Public surveys
determinant in public performance, is strength-  of client satisfaction, public evaluations of
ened when the government's hierarchical control  service providers, and comparisons of perfor-
(monitoring and incentivc systems) is reinforced  mance indicators within and across countries
by the public's willingness and ability to find  may help create a groundswell demand for
altemative  sources  of supply  ("exit")  or to e-ert  reform.
pressure  to perform  ("voice")  - which  wil.
depend  on the relative  costs of these  options,  * Mustering  exit and voice mechanisms  to
what the results  might  be worth,  and the  underly-  correct  the imbalance  among  stakeholders  of
ing degree  of market failure.  public  services. In many  developing  countries,
the mandates  and behavior  of service  providers
The phenomenon  of "capture"  is the ten-  are dominated  by their own  preferences  or the
dency  of those who  manage  and control  the  priorities  of their  supervisors  and influential  elite
allocation  of public  services  to engage  in rent-  groups. The weakest  stakeholders  are the
seeking. Capture,  together  with government  unorganized  public  or the poorer sections  of
monopoly  of many public  services,  the public's  society.
limited  ability  to demand  and monitor  good
performnance,  and problems  in measuring  and  * Checking  monitoring  and incentive  systems
quantifying  the benefits  of services,  make the  used  by service  providers  and their supeivisors
improvement  of public  accountability  complex  for compatibility  with the expectations  of the
and difficult.  stakeholders  - and tradeoffs  must  he worked
off between  them. In developing  countries,
Three things  can be done in the 'nedium  where  poverty  reduction  is a major goal, imlbal-
term to improve  public  accountability  in devel-  ances  must be corrected  so there is a shift  of
oping countries:  services  toward the  poor, and an improvement  in
access  to and quality  Of  services.
* Mobilizing  public  opinion  for change  by
disseminating  comparative  information  about  the
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This  paper  develops  a  conceptual  framework  to analyse  the  problem
of public  service  accountability  In  developing  countries  and  to identify
alternative  vays  to strengthen  it.  An important  proposition  derived  from  this
framework  is  that  effective  public  accountability  can  be sustained  only  when
governnt's  shierarchical  control  over  public  service  providers  is
reinforcod  by the  public's  willingness  and  abllity  to  exits (alternative
sources  of supply)  or to  exert  pressure  on the  providers  to perform  ("voice').
The  desLgn  of effective  accountability  syst  nms  in  developing  countries  should
be of interest  both  to their  governments  and  to international  agencies  such  as
the  World  Bank  that  finance  the  infrastructure  for  public  services  (e.g.,
transport,  water,  electricity,  health  and  education).
The  theoretical  framework  presented  in  the  paper  shows  that  in
general,  the  use  of exit  and  voice  by the  public  will depend  on their  relative
costs  and  on the  expected  returns  to the  public  fro.  their  use in  the  context
of specific  public  services. The  costs  and returns  associated  with exit  and
voice  will in  turn  be influenced  by the  degree  of  market  failure  uuderlying
the  services  in  question.
The  specific  factors  that  influence  the  use  of  exit  and  voice  for
improving  public  accountability  are  seeral.  The  relevant  service
characteristics  on  the  exit  side  are  the  presence  of economies  of scale
(-moopoly),  legal  barriers  to entry,  and spatial  barriers  to  exit.  Voice
potential  is  determined  by  legal,  informational  and institutional  barriers- II  -
facing  the  public,  tha  public's  level  of  incoe and  education  (and  hence
polLtLcal  power),  the  relatLve  mportance  of  the  sorvLce  to  the  public,  and
servLc.  differentLabliLty.  So  of  these  are  natural  barrLers  and
charecterlstIcs  whereas  others  are  artlflcial  or  polLcy  induced.  Iconoloes  of
scale,  spatlal  barrLers,  the  relatlve  liportance  of  servLces,  and
differentiability  are  natural  factors.  Logpl,  formtLonal  and  instLtutLonal
barrlers,  and  Incoe  and  educatLon  characterLstLce  (to  a  large  eztent),  are
pollcy  Induced  factors  Public  services  can  be  cateoorti  d  In  tor  s  of  the
exLt  and  voLce  potentLal  they  afford  the  public  by  reference  to  tbese  barrLors
and  characteriLtics.  An analysis  of  the  features  and  barrlers  of  public
services  and  of  the  publics  lnvolved  can  be  used  to  predict  the  potentLal  for
the  use  of  ezLt  and  voice  in  speciflc  serwLce  contezts.  Thls  analysis  along
with  the  knowledge  of  the  extent  to  which  such  featuresIbarrLirc  are  natural
or  pollcy  lnduced  provlde  a  basis  for  the  design  of  new mechanisms  for  public
accountabliLty  and  improved  servLce  performnce.
A useful  approach  to  the  improveent  of  accountabillty  is  to
devLis  ways  and  means  to  owercome these  barriers  or  to  minimize  the  adverse
effects  of  these  characterLitLcs.  Clearly,  natural  factors  are  more  dlfflcult
to  overcom  than  those  induced  by  polLcy.  Exlt  and  voLce  potentLal  can
therefore  be  sore  easily  realLsed  by  flrst  eliminatlng  the  polLcy  induced
barrlers.  MLniLiLing the  adverse  effects  of  natural  barrlers  will  call  for
more  tim,  effort  and  resources.  Judged  by  these  criteria,  servLces
characteriLed  by weak  voLce  and  low exlt  will  be  the  most  dlfflcult  to  deal
wLth.  Natural  factors  play  a  dominant  role  In  causing  this  combLnatLon of
exlt  and  voice.  The Implications  of  thli  analysis  can  be  seen  In  the  mnu  of
optLons  for  improving  accountabllity  for  servlces  that  fall  under  the- iii  -
different  combinations  of  exit  and  voice  potential  discussed  in  Section  IV  of
the  paper.  A menu  of  options  that  fits  the  problems  of  the  different  ezit-
voice  combinations  is  a  more  useful  approach  to  the  improvement  of  public
service  accountability  than  one  that  offers  a  standard  answer  for  all
situations.  The set  of  propositions  sumariaed  below  can  be  a  gulde  to  the
choice  of  options$
1. When a  public  sorvice  operates  as  a  local  monopoly  due  t-
spatlai  barriers  and  the  public  involved  Is  characterized  by  low  income  and
legal,  informational  and  institutional  barriers,  improved  accountability  is
achieved  through  the  use  of  voice.
2. Under  the  conditions  stated  above,  the  use  of  voice  by  the
public  is  likely  to  be  stimulated  or  assisted  by  the  intervention  of
agents/organizations  outside  of  the  local  coanity  (  e.g.,  NGOs  ).
3. When  a  public  service  is  characterized  by  large  economies  of
scale  and/legal  barriers  to  entry,  and  its  differentiation  is  difficult  while
the  public  involved  or  a segent  of  it  is  not  constrained  by  low  incomes  and
limited  information,  voice  will  tend  to  be  used  to  improve  public
accountability.
4.  The use  of  voice  under  these  conditions  is  likely  to  be
initiated  by  the  public  and  not  through  the  mediation  of  external  agents.
5. When  a  public  service  can  be  differentiated,  but  is  not
constrained  by  economies  of  scale  in  its  production  and  the  public  involved- 1iv_
faces  incoe,  informational  and  institutLonal  barrLers,  improved
accountability  is acmLeved  through  the  use  of exit.
The phenomenon  of capture--the  tendency  of those  who  *maage  and
control  the  allocatioa  of  public  services  to  engage  in  rent  seeking--is  an
important  barrier  to  the  Improviwnt  of  accountability  in  developLng
countries. Capture,  along  with  govervmcot  monopoly  of  many  public  services,
the  limlted  capacity  of  the  public  to  demaud  and  monitor  good  performance,  and
the  problems  n  measuring  and  quantifying  the  benefits  of  services  *mke  the
improvement  of  public  service  accountability  an  especially  complex  and
difficult  undertaking.
What  can  be  done  to  enhance puhlic  service  accountabLlity  in
developing  countrles  in  the  medium  term?  First  of all,  even when  the
phenomenon  of capture  or  other  problems  severely  limit  the  scope  for
slgnificant  reform,  there  is  a  case  for  mobilizing  public  opinion  for  change
through  the  dissemination  of comparative  information  on the  performance  of
public  services. Public  surveys  of client  satisfaction,  public  evaluations  of
service  providers,  comparative  analysis  of  performance  indLcators  within
countries  and  across  countries  can  be  used  to  lay  the  foundation  for  a  ground
swell  in  favor  of  reform.
Second,  there  is  a need  to  correct  the  imbalance  that  has
developed  among the  stakeholders  of public  servLces. in  many developing
countries,  the  mandates  and  behavior  of servLce  providers  are  dominated  by
thelr  own  preferences  or the  prlorlties  of their  supervisors  and  lnfluentlal
elite  groups. The  weakest  stakeholder  is the  public  or lts  segnts  who donot  have  an  adequate  'voice'  for  the  reasons  discussed  in  this  paper.  It  is
important  to  ezauine  the  kinds  of  exit  ard  voice  mechanisms that  can  be
mustered  to  correct  this  imbalance.
Third,  the  hierarchical  control  machanim_  being  used  by  service
providers  and  their  supervisors  (monitoring  and  Incentive  systems)  must  be
checked  for  their  compatibility  vith  the  ezpectations  of  the  stakeholders  and
the  trade  offc  that  have  been  vorked  out  between  them.  The  spectruo  of
performnce  dimensions  (inputs,  access  and  quality)  discussed  in  the  paper
provides  a  useful  basis  for  this  check.  In  developing  countries  where  poverty
reduction  is  a  major  goal,  correcting  the  imbalance  among stakeholders  in
favor  of  the  poor  and  towards  access  and  quality  as  performance  dimensions
merit  special  attention.ACCOUUABILITY  IN  PUBLIC  SnvYICiS
IXIT, VOICS  AND CAPTURU
I.  INTRODUCTION
Recent  years  have  witnessed  a growing  dissatisfaction  with the
performance  of  public  sector  services  in  many  developing  countries. Several
factors  have  contributed  to this  phenomeaon.  The  unprecedented  expansion  of
the  publL'  sector  to  provide  services  which  are regarded  a  essential  to the
public  (public  and  quasi-public  goods),  growing  interventions  by the state  to
regulate  economic  activities  for  externality  and  equity  reasons,  and  the
overstretching  of governmental  administrative  capacity  and resources  in  the
process,  are  the  most important  and  frequently  cited  among  these  factors.
Developed  countries  have  also faced  similar  problems  with public  services,
though  unlike  most developing  countries,  more  of them  have  addressed  these
problems  and  in several  cases  have  found  interesting  and innovative  solutions
to improve  public  service  accountability  (Jabbra  and  Dwivedi  89;  OECD  87;
Heald  89;  Eaves  90).  The  economic  and  financial  crisis  that  gripped  the
developing  world  in the  1980s,  on the  other  hand,  shifted  the  focus  of
governments  and  donors  to the  containment  of this  crisis. While  this  shift
has  led  to concerted  efforts  to reduce  public  sector  size,  improvement  of the
efficiency  and  effectiveness  of public  services  has  remained  a  neglected  area.
Refocussing  attention  on this  task  with special  reference  to the  services  that
directly  affect  the  public  is  long  overdue. 1
1  Government's  output  can  be divided  into  two  categories  of goods  and
servicest  (1)  intermediate  goods  and  services,  which  though  of some  interest
to the  public,  are  essentially  inputs  for  the  production  of other  goods  and
services  to  be delivered  to the  public;  (2)  final  goods  and  servicei  which the
public  or segments  of the  public  receive. Examples  of the  first  are  public-2-
Public  accountability  refers  to the  spectrum  of approaches,
mechanisms  and  practices  used  by the  stakeholders  concerned  with public
services  to  ensure  a desired  level  and  type  of performance. It thus  covers
not  only  the  policies  underlying  accountability,  but  also  the  institutional
system  that  operates  in a  country  to  motivate  service  providers  (agents)  to
deliver  the  desired  type  and level  of  performance. Accountability  provides  a
test  of the  consistency  between  public  policy  and service  provision. Its
effectiveness  will depend  on  whether  influence  of the  concerned  stakeholders
is reflected  in the  monitoring  and incentive  systems  of service  providers. 2
When the latter  are  seen  to  monitor  performance  measures  consistent  with
public  policy  and  are  motivated  to  pursue  the  attainment  of  public  welfare,  an
effective  public  accountability  system  can  be expected  to  exist.
sector  recruitment,  investment  plans,  accounting  and  budgetary  services,  etc.,
that  entail  inter-agency  transactions  within  governments.  Examples  uf the
second  are self  evident  and  numerous. They  include  a  wide range  of goods  and
services,  economic,  social,  and  regulatory,  that  public  agencies  deliver  to
citizens  free  or at a price. The  primary  concern  of this  paper  is  with
government's  final  goods  and  services.
2  Public  _ccountability  involves  three  -,,ups  of inter-related
stakeholders.  The  public  and  the  customers  o.  the  service  (often  a subset  of
the  public  at large)  are  stakeholders  interested  in service  providers  being
accountable  to  them for  attributes  that  benefJt  them  most.  Political  leaders
and  bureaucratic  supervisors  of service  providers  are  stakeholders  who  would
like  the  latter  to be accountable  to them  for  a  mix of  public  policy  and
possibly  private  or parochial  goals  that  interest  them. It is  the  pursuit  of
private  goals  by these  stakeholders  that  results  in rent  seeking  activities
(Buchanan,  et.al.,  1980;  Olsen,  1985). Service  providers  themselves
constitute  a third  category  of stakeholders  with objectives  and interests
often  different  from  those  of the  first  two.  The  public  accountability  system
that  finally  emerges  tends  to reflect  the  relative  bargaining  power  of the
different  sets  of stakeholders  involved. Whether  public  policy  goals  will be
neglected  to facilitate  rent-seeking  activities,  for  example,  will depend  on
who dominates  the  bargaining  process  and  what their  interests  are.- 3 -
A  government's  performance  in reapect  of  public  services  can  be
unsatisfactory  for  a  variety  of reasons: (1)  Governments  often  have a
monopoly  of certain  services,  leaving  little  incentive  for  public  officials  to
be efficient. Public  servants  may  consider  themselves  accountable  to the
public  or society  at large  in  an abstract  sense,  but  may not  feel  accountable
to those  to  whom they  provide  specific  services. Compensation  of  'blic
servants  typically  dcds  not  depend  on their  efficiency  o. responsiveness  to
the  public. (2)  In  many developing  countries,  the  public/beneficiavies  do nco
have  the  ability  or incentive  to  demand  efficient  services  or to insist  on
greater  public  accountability.  It is  also  possible  that  some  segmenits  of the
public  (special  interest  groups)  may  capture  an undue  share  of the  benefits  at
the  expense  of  weaker  sections  (Niskanen  71;  Tullock  65;  BeLker  83).  Lack  of
political  power,  information  gaps  and  a  variety  of institutional  factors  have
facilitated  this  tendency. (3)  The  nature  of some  public  services  is such
that  measurement  and  quantification  of their  benefits  are  not easy. 3 This
further  complicates  public  accountability  which  has traditionally  focused  on
the  internal  means  of supervision  and  control  (hierarchical  control)  in public
agencies. Since  public  services  tend  to  vary in all  these  respects,  there  is
no simple  or unique  answer  to the  complex  issue  of public  sector
accountability.  The  three  sources  of poor  performance  referred  to above
clearly  show  that  any  solution  to the  accountability  problem  must take into
account  the  nature  of the  services  involved  as  well as the  characteristics  of
the  relevant  publics.
3  This is  not  to deny  that  measurement  and  quantification  cannot  or
should  not  be improved.  The  term 'specificity'  has  been used  to  describe  this
feature  and also  to link  it to the  nature  of technology  involved.  See  Arturo
Israel,  Institutional  Development,  Johns  Hopkins  Press,  Baltimore,  1987.- 4 -
The  purpose  of this  paper  is t-e  develop  a  conceptual  framework  to
analyze  the  problem  of  public  service  accountability  and to identify
alternative  ways to strengthen  it.  The  central  argument  of the  paper  is that
publ__  service  accountability  cat.  be sustained  only  when Ohierarchi-il
control'  over  service  providers  or  agents  is  reinforced  by the  public's
willingness  and  ability  to 'exit'  (alternative  sources  of supply)  or to  exert
pressure  on agents  to perform  ('voice').  An  important  finding  is,  however,
that  the  phenomenon  of 'capture,'  described  in  a later  section,  is likely  to
be a  binding  constraint  on public  accountability  in  many developing  countries,
and  a challenge  to the  conventional  wisdom  about  the  factors  that  limit
accountabilicy  as summarized  in  the  preceding  paragraph. As  a backdrop  to the
analysis,  the  practice  of  public  accountability  is  examined  from  a historical
perspective  in Section  II.  A conceptual  framework  for  analyzing  the
determinants  of  accountability  is  presented  in Section  III. Drawing  upon  this
framework,  a  menu of optic-ns  for  improving  accountability  is  then  proposed  in
Section  IV.  Section  V examines  the  phenomenon  of -capture"  as a barrier  to
change,  and its  implications  for  public  service  accountability.  The
conclusions  of the  paper  are  suumarized  in Section  VI.- 5 -
II.  ACCOUNTA3ILITY:  A HISTORICAL  PERSPECTIVE
G;overnments  have,  in general,  considered  public  accountability  as
an essential  prerequisite  for  the  efficient  production  and  delivery  of public
services. Public  service  performance  is,  however,  a complex  phenomenon  that
depends  on a  variety  of factors. (1)  Public  policies  governing  a service  tend
to influence  the  financial  resources,  technology  and  organizational  resources
available  to the  service  provider. (2)  The  characteristics  of the  public  and
its  environment  tend  to  affect  service  outcomes. The income  and  education
levels  of the  public  to  be served,  the  size  of the  public  and  its
heterogeneity,  configuration  of its  values  and  norms  of behavior,  and  the
difficulties  in reaching  the  public  will influence  outcomes. (3)  Government
,iontrol  over  the  service  provider  is  a third  variable  affecting  outcomes. The
bargaining  power  of the  stakehelders  interacting  under  government  auspices  and
government's  internal  control  systems  are  key  components  of this  factor.
While  improving  the  efficiency  of specific  public  services  usually  calls  for
actions  on  many fronts,  the  central  issue  that  is  common  to all  such  services
is  the  question  of  how  governments  and  their  service  providers  can  be made
more  accountable  to the  public  for  their  performance.  As implied  in the
following  definition,  accountability  is the  driving  force  that  generates  the
pressure  for  the  key actors  involved  to  be responsible  for  and  to ensure  good
public  service  performance.
'At  its  most  elementary,  public  accountability  simply
requires  that  public  bodies  give  an account  of their
activities  to  other  people  and  provide  a justification
for  what  has  been  done  in terms  of other  people's
values,  in  a  way that  private  bodies  do not.'  (Stanyer
and  Smith  76)- 6  -
The  prevailing  concepts  and  practices  of public  accountability  can
be traced  to  a  wide range  of developments  in  economics,  political  science,
public  administration  and  law.  Public  finance  and, in  particular,
developments  in  cost-benefit  analysis  and  performance  measurement  have  had  a
major impact  on the  information  being  sought  for  public  accountability  at the
macro  and  micro  level  (Feldstein  85;  Premchand  83;  Bos  86).  Recent
developments  in  public  choice  theory  and  the  New Institutional  Economics  (NIE)
are  also  germane  to the  issue  of public  accountability.
Public  choice  theory  does  not  consider  the  state  and  its  agents  as
neutral  bystanders  in  group  interaction.  This  has  given  rise  to the  positive
theory  of rent  seeking  which  is  concerned  with the  means  used  by interest
groups  in getting  what they  want (Buchanan  80;  Bruenan  and  Buchanan  85;  Olsen
65 and  85). Given  the  bureaucracy's  rent  seeking  tendency,  the  theory
advocates  a  minimalist  state  and  reduction  in  the size  of the  bureaucracy. A
branch  of public  choice  theory,  the  collective  action  literature,  specifies
the  conditions  under  which  groups  of  people  tend  to get  organized  to ensure
the  accountability  of  public  service  providers. NIE,  on the  other  hand,
focuses  on the  role  of transaction  costs,  contracts  and  incentives  as the
route  to greater  accountability  and  performance.  The  approach  here is to
enhance  accountability  by solving  the  principal-agent  problem. Implicit  here
is the  assumption  that  incentives  can  be designed  to  make  hierarchical  control
work. Much of this  work is  concerned  with the  behavior  of the  firm. Whether
the  approach  to the  resolution  of the  agency  problem  proposed  in  the  NIE is
relevant  to the  public  services  discussed  in this  paper  is  not  entirely  clear.Those  who  work in  this field  do recognize  that  problems  of incentives  and
governance  are  enormously  difficult  in  the  political  or public  sector  context
(Williamson  85).
The  concept  and  practice  of public  accountability  have  been
greatly  influenced  by political  theories  and  the  professions  of public
administration  and law (Jabbra  and  Dwivedi  89;  Schuck  83). They  have  evolved
in the  more  developed,  western  countries  in  parallel  with their  socio-
political  evolution. (1)  Democratic  accountability  was the  starting  point  for
many countries  in the  course  of the  last  century. This  represents  a mix  of
political  and  administrative  accountability.  The  government  (ministries,  the
bureaucracy  and  its  constituent  parts)  in this  system  is accountable  to the
political  leadership  (elected  or otherwise)  of the  country  for  its  actions  and
performance.  Ministers,  for  example,  are  accountable  to the
parliament/legislature  in  democratic  countries. Civil  servants  in turn  are
accountable  to their  ministers. Accountability  here is seen  as a  macro  level
concept  as it is  difficult  for  a  minister  or legislature  to supervise  or
control  the  individual  acts  of all  civil  servants  and their  departments. 4
Furthermore,  it  does  not distinguish  between  government's  intermediate  and
final  goods  and services. The  instruments  of  macro  level  accountability
include  legislative  reviews  of  ministry  activities,  periodic  audit  reports  on
public  expenditure,  and  the  practice  of questioning  ministers  in parliament  on
ongoing  government  activities.  Political  leaders/legislatures  act  as
surrogates  for  the  public  in the  system  of democratic  accountability.
4  The  term "macro  level'  is  being  used  here  only  to distinguish  it from
'micro  level'  accountability  which  pertains  to specific  public  services.
Democratic  accountability  is  applicable  not  only  at the  national  level,  but
also  at the local  level. The focus  is  on the  totality  of a political  unit.(2)  The  expansion  of  public  services  which  required  technical
expertise  in their  production  and  delivery  subsequently  led  to the  practice  of
professional  accountability  in  the  public  sector. The  experts  (doctors,
engineers  and  other  specialists)  involved  in these  tasks  are  guided  by their
professional  norms  in  being  accountable  for  the  services  they  provide. They
exert  considerable  autonomy  in  defining  the  public  interest,  on the  basis  of
professional  norms,  and  in  deciding  on the  nature  and  content  of the  services.
The  criteria  of accountability  here  are  heavily  influenced  by the  norms
internally  (from  the  supply  side)  agreed  upon  by professionals  acting  on
behalf  of the  public. This  type  of accountability  at the  micro-level  has  much
broader  application  in the  context  of specific  services  than is  true  of the
concept  of democratic  accountability  discussed  above. It did  not  supplant
democratic  accountability,  but  acted  additively  and  as a response  to the
increasing  complexity  of public  services.
(3)  In recent  years,  judicial  systems  and specially  devised  laws
in some  countries  have  been  used  to augment  the  accountability  of individual
civil  servants  and  units  within  government  who are  responsible  for  the
production  and  delivery  of public  services. The  growing  interactions  of the
public  with the  bureaucracy,  and  the  dysfunctional  impacts  of secrecy  and
anonymity  within  government  on the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of services
have  contributed  much to the  emergence  of the  legal  accountability  concept
(Smookler  89).  By  and large,  its  practice  is  confined  to the  more  developed
countries  with an educated  public  and a  democratic  political  system. Its
evolution  is associated  with the  public's  right  to seek  information  from
government,  the  right  to sue  individual  civil  servants  and  public  agencies  in- 9  -
law  courts  and  the  power  of  courts  to  make the  latter  financially  liable  for
violations  of the  public  interest.
This  pattern  of the  historical  evolution  of public  accountability
reveals  three  interesting  features. (1)  The  original  thrust  of government
accountability  to the  public  rested  with the  political  leadership  at the  macro
level. Attention  to accountability  as  a  means  of controlling  the  behavior  of
individual  civil  servants  for  public  services  is a relatively  recent
development. (2)  The  focus  of the  key  instruments  and  measures  used to  effect
public  accountability  has traditionally  been  on inputs  and  not  on outputs. In
most cases,  the  latter  tend  to  be diverse  and  too  complex  to  measure  and  to
aggregate  though  in recent  years  there  has been  some  progress  on this  front.
On the  other  hand,  public  expenditure  which  is an input  and  a common
denominator  can  be easily  measured  and  audited. Internal  processes  can  be
sssessed  as there  are  generally  uniform  norms  about  their  use  within
government  (e.g..  the  sequences  and  procedures  to  be followed  for
decisionmaking  and  implementation  of decisions). (3)  Except  for  legal
accountability,  a recent  development,  the  primary  concern  of the  concept  of
accountability  has  been on internal  means  of control. Political  leaders,
agencies  and  bureaucrats  act  as proxies  for  the  public  and  hold  those
reporting  to them  accountable  through  control  systems  within  the relevant
organizations.  Legal  accountability  introduces,  however,  the  concept  of the
public  intervening  directly  to  ensure  accountability.  The  dominant  pattern
has thus  been one  of  vertical  or 'upward accountability  and  not  of *outward*- 10  -
accountability. 5 The  key  missing  element  here is  the  view of the  public  as
'customers*  to  be served.
III.  DETERMINANTS  OF ACCOUNTABILITY:  A CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK
Accountability  for  public  services  has traditionally  been  viewed
from  the supply  side (the  standpoint  of the  suppliers  of services)  as is  clear
from  the  following  quote:
'Accountable  management  means  holding  individuals  and
units  responsible  for  performance  measured  as
objectively  as possible. Its  achievemtent  depends  upon
identifying  or establishing  accountable  units  within
government  departments-units  where  output  can  be
measured  against  costs  or  other  criteria,  and  where
individuals  can  be  held  personally  responsible  for
their  performance.'  (Fulton  Committee  68)
This is  a view  of public  accountability  through  'hierarchical
control'  (HC)  . There  are two  supply  side  factors  which  have received
considerable  attention  in the  literature,  namely,  the  design  of services  and
the incentive  structure  governing  suppliers. The  supply  side  argument  is  that
accountability  can  be augmented  by improving  the  design  of the service  and  by
ensuring  adequate  incentives  for  the  supplier  both to  design  and  to deliver
the service. If actions  are  taken  on these  fronts,  it is  assumed  that  public
services  will improve  and  that  accountability  to the  public  will be enhanced.
5  'Upward'  refers  to the  hierarchical  approach  to  control  and 'outward'
to the  accountability  towards  the  public,  a  horizontal  relationship.  An
exception  is  professional  accountability  where  the  behavioral  norm  departs
from  hierarchical  control. See  page 7.- 11  -
This  approach  is  valid,  however,  only  when the  problem  of
principal-agent  relations  within  public  agencies  can  be readily  solved. When
multiple  principals  with conflicting  objectives  exist  (political  actors,  the
public,  and  bureaucratic  supervisors  in this  case),  and  opportunism  and  market
imperfections  prevail(information  asymmetries,  monopoly  conditions),  the  scope
for  collusion  increases,  and  the  agency  problem  remains  unresolved  (Tirole  86;
Levy  87;  Fama  and  Jensen  83). Under  these  conditions,  it cannot  be assumed
that  an accountability  system  based  on HC  will serve  the  interests  of the
relevant  stakeholders.  Alternatively,  HC might  approximate  true  public
accountability  for  some  time (e.g.,  when  good leaders  are  in charge  or soon
after  a  public  revolt),  but  might  not  be sustained.  According  to a recent
assessment,
"there  is  ample  evidence  that it  is exceptionally
difficult  to devise  and  then sustain  control
frameworks:  the  sponsorship  function  from (sponsoring
and  finance)  ministries  to enterprise  is a  very
problematical  one,  not least  in  terms  of objectives,
loyalties  and  timescales.  outcomes  can  depend  heavily
upon  the  personalities  involved  and  on the  wider
cultural  and  political  context. Moreover,  the
difference  between  developed  and  developing  countries
should  be fully  recognized,  especially  when  discussing
the  viability  of public  enterprise  reform  strategies
or options  for  privatization."  (Heald  89)
In  most developing  countries,  the  casualty  in the  cenflicts  between  the
stakeholders  in  public  accountability  is the  public's  viewpoint  (IRAS  89;
Dubashi  90).  The  directiona.l  change  required  in the  reform  of accountability
systems  for  public  services  lies  in  integrating  this  element  into  the  HC
approach.- 12 -
Determinants  of  Accountability
Viewed  from  the standpoint  of the  public,  there  are  two  basic
factors  that  influence  accountability.  One is the  extent  to  which the  public
has access  to alternative  suppliers  of a given  public  service. The  question
here is  whether  there  is  potential  or scope  for  the  public  to exit  when
dissatisfied  with a  public  service. The  second  is the  degree  to  which they
can influence  the  final  outcome  of a service  through  some  form  of
participation  or articulation  of protest/feedback  irrespective  of  whether  the
exit  option  exists. In other  words,  can  they  exert  theJr  voice  in order  to
enhance  accountability?  Exit  and  voice  are  terms  that  Albert  Hirschman  (1970)
made  popular  in  his excellent  discussion  of the  ways in  which  consumers  cope
with the  problem  of performance  deterioration  in the  production  of goods  and
services. 6 He treats  exit  as an  economic  response  mechanism  and  voice  as  a
political  response  mechanism. The  former  is ubiquitous  in the  competitive
market  place  whereas  the  latter  is found  more often  in organizations  such  as
political  parties  and  voluntary  agencies. 7
6  Exit  and  voice  options  can  be both substitutes  and  complements  to each
other  depending  on certain  underlying  conditions  which  Hirschman  develops  in
his  book.  He further  notes  that  the  cost  of  voice  could  be higher  than  that
of exit  in  view  of the  need  for  collective  action  and  the  risk  of the  less
certain  outcomes  of voice. While  Hirschman  recognizes  the  relevance  of these
options  to  both  private  and  public  sectors,  he focusses  almost  exclusively  on
the  world  of  private  goods  where  both  options  are  readily  available.
Furthermore,  he does  not  examine  the  issue  of the  relevance  and  design  of
institutional  devices  or arrangements  for  facilitating  the  use of  exit and
voice  in  varying  contexts  and  the  conditions  under  which  they  will  be optimal.
7  This  generalization  must  be qualified  in  part.  In politics,  forms  of
exit  do exit (leaving  a party). While  in  the  market,  the  use of  voice  is  not
unknown  (a  public  demonstration).- 13 -
The analytical  framework  presented  below  builds  on Hirschman's
concept  of exit  and  voice,  but  with an exclusive  focus  on public  .*trvices.
Two  interrelated  questions  will be explored  here.  Under  what conditions  are
the  exit  and  voice  options  likely  to be efficient  in  enhancing  accountability
in  public  services?  How and  why do public  services  differ  in their  amenability
to the  use  of exit  and  voice  as  a  means  to improve  their  performance?  Answers
to these  questions  are  essential  for  designing  better  approaches  to public
service  accountability.
Diagram  I  below  provides  a simple,  but  generalized  answer  to the
first  question. The  public's  decision  to use  exit,  voice  or a  combination  of
both  will depend  on two  factors,  namely,  the  expected  returns  resulting  from
improved  accountability  (e.g.,  better  quality,  reduction  in  delays  and
corruption,  responsiveness  or other  attributes  that  the  public  value,  etc.),
and  the  costs  associated  with the  use  of exit  and  voice. The relative  costs
of exit  and  voice  and  their  levels  may  vary depending  on the  degree  of  market
failure  affecting  the  services. 8 Market  failure  here  is treated  as external  to
the  service  provider  and is  caused  by externalities,  decreasing  costs  (e.g.,
natural  monopoly)  and  informational  asymmetries.  In DW gram  I, costs  and
returns  are  measured  vertically  while  public  services  are  ranked  horizontally
according  to the  increasing  intensity  of  market  failure. 9
8  The  level  of voice  costs  will  be affected  also  by the  prevailing
socio-political  environment. For  example,  a free  press,  dissemination  of
information,  legal  rights,  etc.  will reduce  costs  for  the  individual.
9  Note  that services  here differ  only in  respect  of the  degree  of market
failure. Strictly  speaking,  only  one type  of  market  failure  snould  be
considered  at a time  along  the  Y axis (e.g.,  natural  monopoly). Needless  to
say,  these  are  highly  restrictive  assumptions.- 14  -
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Assume  that  the  public  is  willing  to use  exit  and  voice  in  order
to improve  public  accountability.  AB represents  the  cost  of exit  associated
with each  of the services  on the  horizonal  axis  and incurred  by an individual
(a  member  of the  public). CD is  the  cost  of voice  estimated  on a similar
basis. Although  the  cost  of  voice  is  often  incurred  in a  group,  each  point  on
the  curve  could  be treated  as the  individual's  cost  of voice. As expected,
for  the  public,  voice  costs  more than  exit for  the range  of services  facing
competition,  but  as  market  failure  increases,  exit  becomes  more  costly  than- 1S -
voice. The  cost  of exit  is  clearly  more sensitive  to  market  failure  than  the
cost  of  voice.  For  example,  the  cost  of creating  an  alternative  (exit)  in the
face  of a  natural  monopoly  will  be enormous. The  cost  of organizing  the
public  to seek  changes  from  the  monopoly  (voice)  will also  be substantial.
But  even  the  cost  of voice  tends  to go  up as the  information  asymmetries
associated  with  market  failure  increases  along  the  Y axis.  Diagram  I shows
that  the  public  services  within  the  range  of  OK  will find  the  use  of exit  more
efficient  for  improving  accountability  whereas  the  services  to the  right  of K
will find  voice  more efficient. When  city  transport  services  permit  both
public  and  private  options,  the  public  will tend  to  use exit, while  faced
with  urban  water supply  problems  the  public  is  more likely  to resort  to  voice.
Diagram  II introduces  the  concept  of the  expected  value  or returns
from  performance  improvement  to the  public  that  improved  accountability  can
bring  about. EF represents  the  axpected  returns  to the  individual  of such
performance  improvement. Its  declining  slope  signifies  the  increasing
difficultv  in improving  accountability  as  market  failure  increases. A
monopoly,  for  example,  is expected  to be less  responsive  to  public  pressure.
Upward  shift  in  the  expected  retuirns  curve  can  occur,  however,  when
supervision  or incentives  are  strengthened  to  make the  service  provider  more
responsive  .1
10  Returns  are  the  monetary  equivalent  of the  gains  from  improved
accountability  that  the  individual  receives  as a result  of the  use  of exit  or
voice.  The  upward  shift  is  treated  here as an  autonomous  step,  but  need  not
always  be so.- 16  -
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Given  the  exit  and  voice  cost  curves,  Diagram  II shows  that  the
combinations  of exit  and  voice  that  are  efficient  for  different  goods  will
vary depending  on the  level  and  slope  of the  expected  return  curves. Thus
when  EF applies,  both exit  and  voice  yield  net  returns  along  the range  of OX1.
Nevertheless,  exit  is clearly  the  more  efficient  option. Within  the  KRMl
range  of services,  voice  is the  superior  option  though  up to  M, exit  continues
to  yield  net returns. For  services  beyond  OL1,  neither  exit  nor  voice  seem
efficient  solutions  though  an  upward  shift  in the  returns  curve  can reduce- 17  -
their  number. Public  services  can  thus  be partitioned  into  three  categories
by reference  to the  net returns  to  performance  improvement  generated  by the
use  of exit  and  voice.
Four  propositions follow  from  this  simple  diagrammatic
presentation. (1)  Exit is  more efficient,  and  hence  more likely  to  be used in
services  least  affected  by  market  failure  whereas  voice  is relatively  more
efficient  as  market  failure  increases. (2)  For  many services,  either  option
or a combination  of the  two  will still  leave  some  net returns  and  therefore
the  choice  may depend  also  on the  preferences  of the  public  for  different
combinations. (3)  The level  of expected  returns  has  a direct  bearing  on the
extent  to  which  voice  will be deployed  especially  in  the  range  of services
most affected  by market  failure. In other  words,  the  public  is likely  to  use
voice  only  when there  is  a high  probability  that  the  public  sector  will  be
responsive  and  make this  investment  worthwhile. (4)  There  are  some  public
services  for  which  the  use  of neither  exit  nor  voice  mechanisms  will  be
efficient. If an  upward  shift  in  the  returns  curve  occurs,  a decline  in their
number  will follow. These  are  the  services  most  affected  by  market  failure.
We shall  now  move  on to the  second  question  and  explore  the
variables  that  influence  the scope  for  exit  and  voice  in the  context  of
different  types  of  public  services. This  will take  us beyond  the  aggregative
approach  of  Diagram  II  which  considered  services  solely  as a function  of
market  failure  and  the  public  as an  undifferentiated  lot.  Further
disaggregation  will  provide  a useful  basis  for  designing  improved  approaches
to accountability.- 18 .
Exit  Determinants
(1) Economies  of scale  are  important  in  the  production  of  many
public  and  quasi-public  goods. Natural  monopolies  with increasing  returns  to
scale  are  well known  examples. In  a country  or  a  geographical  area  where
there  is scope  for  only  one  enterprise  or agency  to  produce  and  deliver  a
service,  the  public's  potential  for  exit  is limited  or non-existent,  and  hence
exit  cost is  high.
(2) Legal  barriers  to entry  may exist  in a country  which limits
the  public's  scope  for  exit. Registration  of  vehicles  and  trade  controls  can
be  viewed  as legal  barriers  which  the  public  cannot  escape  unless  illegal
action  is resorted  to.  This  is because  the  state  prohibits  by law  other
suppliers  from  delivering  a given  public  service  though  there  is technically
no reason  why others  cannot  supply  the  same  service. In  many countries,
barriers  to entry  in sectors  such  as road  and  air  transport  and  education
illustrate  this  point.
(3)  Spatial  barriers  may limit  the  potential  fo;  exit  for  some
segments  of the  public. Here  the  problem  lies  not  in the  nature  of the  good
or service  but  in the  characteristics  of the  public. Thus  there  may  be scope
for  only  one  small  school  or health  clinic  in  an isolated  village. The
constraint  is  not the  existence  of scale  economies,  but  rather  that  certain
features  of the  public  (e.g.,  location)  limit  their  potential  exit.  However,
the  effect  on the  service  (as  when scale  economies  exist)  is that  it operates
like  a local  monopoly. Migration  by people  facing  poor  performance,  of
course, is a form of exit, but a costly one under these circumstances.- 19  -
(4) Where  the  nature  of a good  or service  is such  that  no member
of the  public  can  be excluded  from  access  to it,then  exit  by definition  is
ruled  out.  Pure  public  goods  such  as defense  or environmental  protection  are
classic  examples.
Voice  Determinants
(1)  Legal  and  institutional  barriers  to  voice  may exist  in  a
country  thus  making  it difficult  for  segments  of the  public  to use  their
voice. In some  cases,  this  could  be traced  to the  nature  of the  larger
political  system  or ideology. Even  where  an open  or  democratic  political
system  exists  in  a country,  its  laws  and legal  and  institutional  devices  may
not  permit  or may  constrain  the  use  of voice  (e.g.,  legal  barriers  to the
recognition  of user  groups,  lack  of public  hearings  and  denial  of the right  to
sue  public  service  suppliers).  It is  possible  that  nothing  is  wrong  with the
laws,  but the  procedures  and  practices  used  in their  implementation  stifle  or
delay  the  use  of voice (e.g.,  procedures  used  by courts,  access  made  difficult
through  the  location  of facilities).
(2)  Informational  asymmetries  can  be a severe  constraint  on the
public's  use  of voice. Service  providers  often  possess  information  that is
not available  to the  public. Governments  may restrict  the  public's  access  to
information  or limit  the  scope  for  the  media  to challenge  or publicize  the
poor  quality  and  other  attributes  of services. Dissemination  of information
may also  be limited  by the  poor  technologies  available  in the  country.
Inadequate  telecommunications  and  TV facilities  illustrates  this  problem.- 20 -
Those  who  have  privileged  access  to  the relevant  information  on services  such
&3  elite  groups  may  take  advantage  of it at the  expense  of other  segments  of
the  public. The  net result  is  that  for  ordinary  people,  the  transaction  costs
of  voice  will  be very  high.
(3) Non-differentiation  of public  services  can  aid  the  use  of
voice  under  certain  conditions. 11 A quasi  public  good  such  as drinking  water
and  public  parks  are  non-differentiable  products. Since  all  segments  of the
public  have an interest  in  their  supply  and  quality,  those  with a  weak voice
a180  gain from  the  voice  of the stronger  segments  of the  public  (Wade  1988).
Non-differentiation  of services  thus  creates  an "externality'  effect  on voice.
In  the  case  of education,  for  example,  it is  possible  to  differentiate
services  (schools  with  varying  quality),  and  hence  the  externality  effect  does
not  obtain.
(4) Income,  education  and related  attributes  of the  public
increase  their  ability  to  use  voice. Even  when information  is  available,  lack
of education  may limit  its  proper  analysis  and  use  by the  people. The  cost  of
voice  can  be too  burdensome  for  low  income  people. Lack  of knowledge  and
skills  constrains  them  in their  assessment  of options  and  in  demanding  better
service  or access. The  poor  and illiterate,  therefore,  are  usually  the
weakest  in respect  of  voice,  though  their  numbers  may  be large.
(5) The  relative  importance  of a service  to the  public  also
influences  voice. Thus  if a  person  spends  a significant  proportion  of  his
11  This term  refers  to the  concept  of 'product  differentiation'
frequently  used in studies  of industrial  organization  and  marketing.- 21 -
income  or time  on a service,  or develops  a continuing  relationship  with the
service  provider  ('product  involvement'),  his incentive  to use  voice is
greater  than  when the  service  is  of little  consequence  or is  not durable  in
terms  of future  relationships  or benefits. 12 This is  true  even  when the
individual  has  an exit  option.  Examples  are  housing  and  health  services
(doctor-client  relations). In  health  care,  there  is  a  clear  information
asymmetry  between  doctors  and  patients. The  latter  depend  on the  advice  and
expertise  of the  doctors  they  trust. Exit  will,  therefore,  be a last  resort
and  is likely  to  be preceded  by the  use  of voice.
The  foregoing  discussion  of the  factors  underlying  exit  and  voice
shows  that  both  the  nature  of the  good  or service  and  the  characteristics  of
the  public  exert  an important  influence  on these  options. Natural  or
artificial  (policy  induced)  monopoly  turns  out  to  be an important  attribute  of
many  public  services  (e.g.,  electricity,  regulatory  services)  that  tends  to
limit  the  public's  scope  for  exit. The  ability  and  willingness  of the  public
to respond  to this  condition  through  voice  can  in  part  be policy  induced,  but
are  also  a function  of certain  attributes  of the  public  (e.g.,  income,
education,  location,  etc.). In the  final  analysis,  the  factors  identified
above  influence  the  costs  facing  the  public  and  thus  their  choices  between  the
two  options. For  example,  if spatial  barriers  are  high for  a person,  the  cost
of taking  the  exit route  is likely  to  be substantial  for  him.  Hence  he is
likely  to  explore  the  voice  option  first  before  resorting  to  exit.  On the
other  hand,  where spatial  barriers  are low  or  when  a service  is relatively
unimportant  to  an individual,  he may find  the  cost  of voice  to  be higher
12  Product  involvement  is  a term  used in  the  field  of  marketing,  and is
a proxy  for  the  relative  importance  of  goods  to consumers.- 22 -
relative  to that  of exit. Thus  the  public  may face  high  or low  natural  or
policy  induced  barriers  with respect  to exit  or  voice  or both.  Public
services  can  be categorized  by the  severity  of these  barriers  and
characteristics.
Combinations  of Exit  and  Voice
Public  services  are  categorized  below  into  different  groups
according  to the  criteria  of exit  and  voice. First,  services  can  be
classified  according  to  whether  there  is scope  for  the  public  to exit if
dissatisfied  with  what they  get. This  is a  proxy  measure  for  the feasibil.ity
of  competition  in  the  production  and  delivery  of services. Second,  public
services  differ  in  the  degree  to  which  their  beneficiaries  can  make their
voices  heard  if  dissatisfied  with the  outcomes. For analytical  purposes,
Diagram  III  depicts  four  different  combinations  of  exit and  voice  that  provide
a useful  basis  for  the  classification  of public  services. These  should  not,
however,  be treated  as  watertight  divisions.  As the  vertical  and  horizontal
arrows  imply,  they  reflect  degrees  of actual  or  potential  possibilities  for
the  use  of exit  and  voice. Examples  of  public  services  that  fit  the  different
combinations  of  exit  and  voice  are  given  in  Diagram  IV.
Cell  1 above  represents  public  services  that  fit  the  low  exit-
weak voice  combination.  The  nature  of the  services  in this  category  is  such
that  exit  will  be extremely  difficult  or costly  for  the  public. At the same
time,  the  beneficiaries  involved  are  disadvantaged  in the  sense  of being
either  poor  or illiterate  or both. Hence  their  weak  voice.  They  have limited
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exacerbated  by legal,  informational  and institutional  barriers. The  public
services  in this  cell  can  be produced  efficiently  on a  small  scale  (e.g.,  to
meet the  needs  of a small  town  or village). While  economies  of scale  are  thus
not a  barrier,  spatial  barriers  to  exit  tend  to  operate. To illustrate,  a
village  needs  only  a single  primary  school  which  can  be operated  efficiently.
If,  however,  some  villagers  are  dissatisfied  with the  school's  services,  the- 24 -
exit  option  may not  be open  to them  as the  next school  may be located  in  a far
away  place. Distance  and  not scale  economies  is the  source  of the  monopoly
condition  present  in  this  case. Farthermore,  the  public  in this  cell  do not
offer  any  scope  for  product  differentiation.  Health  services,  agricultural
extensicn, rural  water  supply  and  regulatory  services  affecting  the  poor
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A combination  of low  exit  and  strong  voice  characterize  Cell  2.
Here  again,  exit  for  those  dissatisfied  with  a service  is impossible  or
expensive,  but  the  scope  for  voice  is  considerable.  Scale  economies  matter  a
great  deal in  the  production  and  delivery  of services  in this  cell.  Natural
monopolies  owned  or regulated  by government  illustrate  the  problem. Voice  can- 25 -
be strong  here  for  two  reasons. Given  the  nature  of the  services,  product
differentiation  is  not  possible  or is  extremely  difficult  to design  with the
result  that  the  entire  public  gets  more or less  the  same  quality  and  type  of
service. Even  if only  a segment  of the  concerned  public  is capable  of
exerting  voice,  everyone  stands  to benefit  from  such  action  due  to the
externality  effect  explained  above. Utilities  such  as electricity,
telecommunications,  urban  water  supply,  and  irrigation  are  examples  of
services  in  this  cell. Regulatory  services  affecting  publics  with a strong
voice  also  belong  to  Cell  2 (e.g.,  industrial  licensing,  foreign  trade
regulation,  etc.). The  public  here is  capable  of  using  voice  on its  own
initiative.  Organized  groups  of producers  and  consumers  with strong  interest
in service  outcomes  are found  in  these  sectors  at least  in some  countries.
If service  characteristics  such  as product  differentiation  are in
fact  present  in a service  in  Cell 2, the  expected  positive  externality  effect
on the  use  of voice  is  unlikely  to emerge. Thus  when there  is scope  for
product  differentiation  in  a service,  externalities  enjoyed  by the  weaker
segment  of the  public  (low  voice)  will tend  to disappear  and  the  use  of voice
by the  stronger  segment  will  not improve  accountability  for  all.  Under
conditions  of  extreme  inequality,  this  may  be the  case in irrigation,  for
example,  where  large  farmers  could  use  voice  to get  a disproportionate  share
of  water  at the  cost  of smaller  farmers. Similarly,  in  the  case  of
electricity,  the  basic  product  cannot  be easily  differentiated,  but  the
related  elements  of repair  and  maintenance  can  be differentiated  between
different  segments  of the  public. Improved  accountability  here  would  still
require  the  use  of  voice,  but  possibly  with some  external assistance  for  the
weaker  segment.- 26 -
Cell  3 depicts  services  with a  high  exit-weak  voice  combination.
As in  Cell  1, the  services  here  are  not sensitive  to scale  economies. This
means  that in  a  given  geographical  area  like  a  city,  several  units  can
efficiently  produce  and  deliver  the services.  When performance  deteriorates,
this  will  enable  the  public  to  exit  provided  multiple  service  providers  exist.
At the  upper  end  of the  spectrum  in  Cell  3, the  scope  for  exit  may  be reduced
through  policy  induced  legal  barriers  to entry. 13 Thus  a government  may
permit  education  only  under  public  auspices  although  voluntary  agencies  or
private  entities  could  provide  this  service. Product  differentiation,
however,  is  feasible  in these  services,  thus  making  it  possible  for  those  with
strong  voice  to opt  for  the  quality  they  prefer. This tendency  separates  the
segment  of the  public  with  weak voice  from  the  former. Even if  product
differentiation  is not  present,  policy  induced  legal,  informational  and
institutional  barriers  to  voice  may  also  weaken  the  public's  voice.  Urban
services  which  lend  themselves  to  differentiation  will fall  into  this  cell.
e.g.,  low  income  housing,  and  health  clinics  in  poor  areas. Between  exit  and
voice,  for  the  weak public  in this  cell,  exit  is the  more  efficient  option
though  voice  may  play a supplementary  role  when  policy-induced,  informational
and institutional  barriers  are  eliminated.
Finally,  Cell  4  refers  to some  of the  quasi  public  and  private
services  that  governments  might  provide  under  public  auspices  for  a  variety  of
reasons. Here,  services  are  characterized  by low  tO  moderate  economies  of
scale  so that  potentially  several  units  could  produce  them  in a given
13  Note  that  scope  for  exit increases  as  one  moves  down  vertically  from
Cell  1 to  Cell 3.- 27 -
geographical  area. As a result,  the  potential  for  the  public  to exit is  high
when faced  with  performance  deterioration.  The  relative  importance  of these
services  to the  public  is  high thus  causing  their  'product  involvement'  to be
high.  This,  coupled  with the  fact  that  services  can  be differentiated  for  the
benefit  of the  public  with  high income,  education,  etc.,  may facilitate  the
use  of voice  by the  latter. These  services  may often  be the  same  as those  in
Cell  3,  but  differentiated  for  the  higher  income  groups  who  normally  can  exert
a  strong  voice. High  quality  schools,  hospitals,  and  air  transport  are
examples.
Some  of the  barriers  and  characteristics  discussed  above  are
natural  whereas  others  are  policy  induced  or political  in  nature. Economies
of scale,  spatial  barriers,  the  relative  importance  of services,  and
infeasibility  of  product  differentiation  are  natural  factors. Some  of the
policy-induced  factors  may  originate  in  political  discrimination  or denial  of
rights,  e.g.,  low  income  or education  and  some  legal  barriers. In general,
political  barriers  are  reflected  in  policy-induced  factors. Legal,
information  and institutional  barriers,  and  income  and  education
characteristics  (to  a large  extent),  are  thus  policy-induced  factors. Public
services  can  be categorized  in terms  of the  exit  and  voice  potential  they
afford  the  public  by reference  to  these  barriers  and  characteristics.
The  mix of barriers  and  characteristics  in  the four  cells  of
Diagram  III  can  be used  to  predict  the  degree  of exit  and  voice  potential  that
different  public  services  can  have.  The  basis  of the  prediction  is an
analysis  of the services  in terms  of these  characteristics/barriers  and  the
extent  to  which  they  are  natural  or policy  induced. There  are,  however,  some- 28  -
services  which  are  similar  in  nature  between  certain  cells. This is  because
when provided  to different  types  of population  the  same  service  can  be
characterized  by differing  degrees  of exit  or  voice  potential. For  example,
primary  education  is found  in  both  Cells  1 and  3 of  Diagram  IV.  Nevertheless,
from  the  standpoint  of accountability,  this  seeming  overlap  does  not imply  a
duplication. Contextual  features  and attributes  of the  public  need  not  be the
same  even for  identical  services. An urban  primary  school,  unlike  a rural
school,  may leave  an exit  option  for  the  public. If the  relative  importance
of this  service  to  a segment  of the  public  is  high (product  involvement),
voice  may  be resorted  to  before  exit. This  difference  is  relevant  to the
determination  of the  approach  to accountability  to be adopted. What
distinguishes  each  cell is  the  positioning  of a  set  of public  services  in the
context  of a  unique exit-voice  combination.
IV.  IMPROVING  ACCOUNTABILITY:  A MENU  OF OPTIONS.
What options  are  available  to improve  public  accountability  for
the services  in the  four  cells  discussed  above?  This  question  can  best  be
answered  by  viewing  the  features  of each  service  against  the  constraints  and
opportunities  for  exit  and  voice  being  faced  by the relevant  publics. Options
here refer  to alternative  remedies  or solutions  to  the  problem  of
accountability.  Given  the  diversity  in  the  characteristics  of services  and
their  publics,  a  menu approach  is  clearly  superior  to an approach  that
promotes  a single  or standardized  solution.
Some  implications  for  improving  public  service  accountability  are
self  evident  in  Diagram  III. First,  the  accountability  problem  appears  to  be- 29 -
most severe  in  Cell 1  where  the  potential  for  both  exit  and  voice  are  low.
Second,  the  search  for  improved  accountability  as one  moves  down  to  Cell 3
should  focus  more on  exit (for  example,  private  or competitive  delivery)  than
on  voice.  To improve  accountability  in  Cell  2, on the  other  hand,  the  thrust
should  be on  voice  rather  than  on exit. The  greatest  need  for  improving
accountability  is in these  three  cells  with  Cell  1 and  3 deserving  priority
attention. Third,  the  search  process  should  first  explore  the  scope  for
eliminating  policy  induced  barriers  and  characteristics  as a  means  to improve
accountability.  Natura.  barriers  or features  are  more  difficult  to deal  with.
Hence  the  payoff  from  the  latter  will be smaller  and  the  time  taken  to achieve
improvements  will be longer.
A suggestive  menu of  options  for  improving  accountability  through
the  use  of exit  and  voice  mechanisms  is  offered  in  Diagram  V.  The specific
choices  to be made  will depend  on the  exit-voice  potential  combination  that
exists  in  a given  context. To illustrate,  the  public  in  Cell  1  whose  exit  and
voice  potential  is low,  faces  natural  exit  barriers  whereas  most of their
voice  barriers  are  policy-induced.  Accountability  can  be achieved  here  not
through  exit,  but  through  the  use  of voice  aided  by external  agents  (e.g.,
NGOs  or public  evaluation). For  the  public  in Cell  2  who  have  strong  voice,
mechanisms  such  as public  hearings,  and  participation  in  decision  bodies  can
help improve  accountability.  This  group  may  well  deploy  voice  mechanisms  on
their  own rather  than  depend  on external  support  or initiative.  Those  in  Cell
3  who  are  weaker  in  voice  can  explore  exit  mechanisms  such  as  vouchers  and
contracting  out.
Diagram  V shows  that  exit/voice  mechanisms  do not  influence- 30 -
accountability  in icolation.  The  proposition  is that  exit,  voice,  and  HC
determine  accountability  in an interactive  mode.  This  is important  because
the  test  of the  impact  of these  mechanisms  lies  in  the  behavior  of the  public
agencies  involved,  though  the  case  for  the  use  of exit  and  voice  to improve
accountability  is theoretically  persuasive.  Some  have  argued  that  while  exit
might  cause  private  providers  to be  more  efficient,  a  competing  public  agency
might  revert  to the 'quiet  life'  as it  faces  less  demand  pressure  from  the
public. The  crux  of the  matter  is in  the  medium  through  which  the signals
from  exit  or voice  are  transmitted  to service  providers. The  only  medium  that
can  directly  pass  on these  signals  to them is  HC as the  incentives  that
influence  the  behavior  of service  providers  operate  through  HC.  The  tendency
of public  service  providers  to resort  to the  quiet  life  in the  face  of exit
can  therefore  be explained  in  terms  of  a missing  or inadequate  HC.
DIAGRAM  V
Mechanisms  for  Accountability
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Wlll the  use  of exit  and  voice  mechanisms  result  in the
improvement  of public  accountability?  A positive  anjwer  to this  question  will
depend  on tw)  conditions. First,  the  use  of exit  and  voice  should  be
consistent  with the  characteristics  of the  services  and the  publics  involved.
An analysis  of the  features  and  barriers  of  public  services  and  of the  publics
involved  can  be used  to predict  the  potential  for  the  use  of exit  and  voice  in
specific  service  contexts. This  analysis  along  with the  knowledge  of the
extent  to  which  the  features/barriers  are  natural  or  policy  induced  provide  a
basis  for  the  design  of new  mechanisms  for  public  accountability  and improved
service  performance.  The following  propositions  specify  the  conditions  under
which  accountability  will  be improved  through  the  use  of exit  and  voice.
When a public  service  is  characterized  by limited  exit  potential
and  by a public  with  a low  voice  potential,  accountability  can  be
strengthened  through  the  use  of  voice. External  agents  may aid
the  public  in  the  use  of voice.
*  When a service  offers  low  exit  potential,  but  the  public  has  voice
potential,  accountability  can  be strengthened  through  the  use  of
voice  mechanisms.
*  When a service  is  characterized  by exit  potential,  and  the  public
has low  voice  potential,  accountability  can  be strengthened
through  the  use  of exit.
*  When a service  is  characterized  by 'product  involvement'  and
offers  potential  for  both  exit  and  voice,  accountability  can  be- 32 -
strengthened  through  a combination  of exit  and  voice  mechanisms.
Second,  exit  and  voice  should  cause  the  behavior  of the  public
service  provider  to  change. Since  EC is  the  instrument  for  achieving
behavioral  changes  in the  service  provider,  the  condition  to  be met is  that
its  monitoring  and  incentive  systems  are  adapted  in response  to exit  and
voice (see  Diagram  V).  This  is important  because  if  HC  has not  been adapted,
the  public  service  provider's  behavior  is  unlikely  to be affected  and  exit  and
voice  would  not  have  had  their  desired  impact  on accountability.  With the  use
of exit,  for  example,  some  segments  of the  public  may benefit  by moving  to
private  providers. The  public  service  provider  may still  remain  as
inefficient  and ineffective  as before  if  he does  not  get  the  right  signals
through  an adapted  HC.  A measure  of the  adaptation  is the  extent  to  which
monitoring  by the  provider  spans  efficiency,  access  and  quality  instead  of
being  limited  to inputs  and  compliance  with  internal  rules. When such
monitoring  is reinforced  by appropriate  incentives  to the  provider,  HC can  be
said  to have  adapted  to  exit  and  voice.  If  an adaptive  response  does  not
follow,  exit  and  voice  mechanisms  may be further  modified  so as to give
stronger  signals  to  the  provider. When  mutual  consistency  between  HC, exit
and  voice  is  achieved,  the  second  condition  for  improving  public
accountability  is satisfied.
We shall  now  examine  the  relevance  of the  exit  and  voice
mechanisms  of Diagram  V for  improving  the  accountability  of services  that  fall
under  the  different  cells  of Diagram  III. Though  they  are  important,  less
attention  is  paid  here  to the  role  of HC  mechanisms  (monitoring,  incentives,
etc.)  mainly  because  there  is an extensive  literature  on the subject  'Heald- 33 -
89;  Herzlinger  79;  Ramanathan  82).
Low Exit - Weak Voice
Since  both  exit  and  voice  are lifficult  or too  costly  for  the
public  in  Cell  1, these  services  pose  the  most severe  challenge  to those  who
design  accountability  systems  . When  there  are  severe  constraints  on exit  and
voice,  the  traditional  approach  of improving  accountability  through  better  HC
will  have serious  limitations,  chiefly  because  the  principal-agent  problem
referred  to in  an earlier  section  cannot  be satisfactorily  resolved  in  a non-
competitive  setting  with  multiple  principals  who  have conflicting  goals  or
preferences.  The  answer  therefore lies  in  searching for  ways to expand  the
exit  and  voice  options,  and  integrating  them  with appropriate  HC  mechanisms.
Given  the  constraints  on exit,  however,  the  focus  of
accountability  in  Cell  1  has to  be on voice. The  exercise  of voice  is  not
only  costly  for  the  poor in  terms  of time  and  effort,  but  also  more risky  than
exit  as the  outcomes  of voice  are  le3s  certain. The  poor  are  unlikely,
therefore,  to readily  invest  in the  use  of voice. Given  the  high  costs  of
voice  facing  them,  the  endeavor  should  be to  search  for  voice  surrogates.
Tbhse  are  external  agents  who  mobilize  or organize  the  local  public  in  order
to demand  and  monitor  better  service  performance.  Non-governmental
organizations  (NGOs)  are  well  known  for  playing  this  role. In some  cases,
they  may also  act  as service  providers. Their  voice  augmenting  role  tends  to
reduce  the  cost  of voice  to the  local  public  who are  generally  poor  and
illiterate.  TJnder  monopoly  conditions  involving  the  poor,  this  form  of cost
internalization  by an external  agency  can  tilt  the  balance  in  favor  of the  use- 34 -
of  voice  by the  public. In  health  services,  population  control,  and
education,  NGOs  have  played  this  role  admirably  in  many  developing  countries
(Paul  87;  Esman  and  Uphoff  84).  The  alternative  of a local  community
organizing  itself  to  exert  voice  is also  feasiblel4.  The  cost  of voice  in
this  case  has  to be  borne  fully  by the  community,  a burden  that  many  poor
groups  are  unable  to  bear.  In both  cases,  the  incentive  within  the
organizations  to ensure  accountability  is aided  by a sense  of  professionalism
and  commitment  rather  than  by financial  rewards.
Dissemination  of information  about  services  can  aid the  public  in
demanding  greater  accountability  from  service  providers. More systematic
pressure  can  be exerted  through  a periodic  public  monitoring  and  evaluation  of
the  relevant  public  services. This  can  be done  under  public  or  private
auspices. An expert  group,  for  example,  can  be commissioned  to  poll the
beneficiaries  or gather  data  from  them  as  well  as the  service  providers  for
analysis  and  comparison  across locations  and  over  time.  Compared  to the
direct  use  of voice,  this  is less  demanding  and  less  costly  for  the  public.
Again,  this  is  a surrogate  for  voice  through  external  intervention  and  is
designed  to  promote  greater  accountability.  Its  limitation  is that  such
evaluation  invariably  calls  for  public  resources.  Public  surveys  have been
used  extensively  in  Australia,  France,  Canada  and  the  Netherlands  as a usable
means  of feedback  on tax  administration  (OECD  87). Canada,  for  example,
gathers  feedback  on taxation  from  clients  on a continuing  basis. In this
context,  transparency  of the  methods  and  data  used  and  care in  the
dissemination  and  use  of findings  assume  special  importance.
14,  Since  the  1960s,  many  experiments  in  the  use  of  voice  have  been
attempted  in the  developing  world  with a special  focus  on the  poor.- 35 -
Complaints  procedures  And  the  institutional  mechanism  of the
ombudsman'  are  ways of providing  voice  to the  people  when there  is  no need  or
incentive  for  collective  action. Here the  attempt  is to let  individuals  make
known  their  problems  to  designated  authorities  for  redressal. "Hotlineq,  can
be established  to  help  the  public  respond  fast  to unsatisfactory  services  or
decisions  by public  agencies. A review  of international  evidence  in this  area
shows  that  these  mechanisms  are  in place  in  many countries,  but that  their
utilization  and  impact  vary  widely. An important  finding  is that  in  poor
societies,  it is the  elites  who tend  to  use  these  devices  more effectively.
In  Tanzania  where  the  ombudsman  did  not  evoke  any  response  from  villagers,  a
special  effort  was  made to reach  out  by adopting  a  mobile  approach,  but  with
limited  results  (Eaves  90).
Though  spatial  barriers  are  the  binding  constraint  on exit,  it is
possible  that  new technologies  for  service  delivery  can  be  used to augment  the
scope  for  exit.  For  example,  under  certain  conditions,  mobile  courts,  schools
and  hospitals  can  cross  spatial  barriers  and  offer  more options  to the  public
in  the  fields  of criminal  justice,  education,and  health. 15 As Hirschman  has
noted,  there  is a risk  that  easier  exit  may  not  necessarily  eliminate  the
performance  deterioration  in  the  local  public  school  or clinic. The fact
remains,  however,  that  technology  can  be a source  of  exit  expansion  under
certain  conditions  and  may  cause  overall  accountability  to improve.
15  A mobile  service  assumes  that  road  transport  is  available. For
example,  even  if a  village  has  only  one  clinic  or  one  doctor,  another  doctor
may also  visit  and  offer  services  to the  people  through  the  use  of a van
equipped  with supplies.- 36 -
Low  Exit - Strong  Voice
In  view  of the  domtnance  of scale  economies,  the  scope  for
improving  accountability  through  the  exit  option  is limited  in this  case.
Supplementary  generation  of electricity  by agents  other  than  an existing
monopoly  can  be thought  of, for  example,  as a means  of increasing  competition
in  the  utility  field. But  the  impact  of such  measures  remains  relatively
insignificant.  The  improvement  of accountability  must  therefore  be sought  in
devising  creative  ways to  use  voice.
Since  strong  voice  characterizes  this  cell,  an important  option  to
explore  is  the  participation  of the  public's  representatives  in the  decision
making  bodies  of service  providers. For  example,  users'  representatives  can
be made  members  of the  boards  of  directors  or committees  of these
organizations.  'Where  appropriate,  users  may  hold stocks  of utilities  so  that
they  have  a stake  in  their  management  and  performance. In  most developing
countries,  such  use  of voice  or 'public  participation'  is  conspicuous  by its
absence. Irrigation  projects,  for  example,  are  typically  owned  by
governments.  Yet,  beneficiary  farmers  could  be made  joint  investors,  or
responsible  for  management  and  maintenance,  thereby  creating  a strong
incentive  for  them  to  demand  and  facilitate  good  performance.
In  developed  countries,  public  participation  in  the regulatory
process  is  an established  practice. In the  U.S.,  many regulatory  agencies
have a statutory  duty to  provide  a forum  for  disputes  arising  in the  course  of
the  agency's  rule  making,  or between  those  regulated  and  those  affected  by the
actions  of the  industry  concerned. Since  public  participation  in this  process- 37 -
was limited  relative  to that  of the  regulated  industries,  intervenor  funding
mechanisms  have  been  created  in some  cases  to deal  with this  imbalance. Thus
the  California  Public  Utilities  Commission  has  established  a  mechanism  for
after  - the - fact  funding  to groups  and  individuals  who  have a financial
hardship  and  who have  made  unique  contributions  to a decision  adopted  by the
Commission. Another  example  of public  involvement  is in "negotiated  rule
making'  that  brings  together  representatives  of an agency  and  the  relevant
interest  groups  to  negotiate  the  text  of a proposed  rule. Regulatory
negotiation  has  been  used  by the  Environmental  Protection  Agency  and  other
departments  of the  U.S.  Government.
Where  direct  participation  of users  in  decision  making  is
difficult  or inappropriate,  it  may  be possible  to consult  them  on important
issues  or to afford  them  opportunities  to  express  their  views  on  key  decisions
directly  affecting  them. Public  hearings  on the  revision  of rates  in
utilities  is a good  example  of this  approach. Advisory  panels of a  standing
nature  are  another  institutional  mechanism. These  devices  can  be set  up by
service  providers  or through  regulatory  agencies  which  are  in  any  case
necessary  given  the  monopolistic  nature  of the  activities  involved. Since
large  scale  organizations  are  typical  of the  services  in  Cell 2,  any  direct  or
indirect  voice  mechanism  will act  as  a useful  countervailing  force  against  the
potential  collusion  implied  in the  multiple  principal-agent  relations  alluded
to earlier.
Finally,  public  evaluation  of the  type  discussed  under  Cell  1  and
provision  for  legal  redress  of complaints  can (e.g.,  hotlines,  ombudsman,
etc.)  play  a positive  role  here.  The  dissemination  of comparative  performance- 38 -
data,  including  the  publication  of performance  indicators  on costs,  access  and
quality,  etc.,  can  be expected  to sensitize  users  to demand  better  service  and
thus  to  create  further  pressure  for  accountability.
High Exit - Weak Voice
Since  exit  is relatively  less  costly  than  voice  for  the set  of
services  in  Cell  3, the  basic  thrust  of accountability  improvement  here should
be on  expanding  the scope  for  exit.
Deregulation  of services is  an obvious  option  to consider  since
there  is  usually  space  for  both  public  and  private  service  providers  to
coexist  and  compete. For  example, deregulatory  measures  in the  education
sector  may induce  the  establishment  of  private  schools  along  side  public
schools. Monopolies  granted  to  trade  agencies,  when abolished,  will encourage
private  traders  also  to enter  the  field. Since  the  public  involved  is
poor(weak  voice),  the  public  function  of regulation  and  possibly  subsidization
is likely  continue. One  option  is  to  make grants  to  the  private  providers  so
as to  minimize  any  adverse  economic  impact  of deregulation  on the  poor.
Grants  -in-aid  to  NGOs  have  been  used  in both  health  and  education  sectors  to
achieve  this  objective. Food  stamps  or ration  cards  can  be used  for  the  same
purpose  in the  area  of essential  goods  distribution.
If for  some  reason,  certain  services  require  close  government
supervision,  contracting  them  out  to  multiple  private  providers  can  be another
option. This  approach  would  permit  careful  monitoring  and  quality  control
while  affording  increased  scope  for  exit  to  the  public. Municipal  services  of- 39 -
various  kinds (garbage  disposal,  road  maintenance,  tax  or fee  colle^tion.
etc.)  have  been  contracted  out  in  many  developed  countries. An important  way
in  which  this  mechanism  impacts  accountability  and  performance  is through  its
'contestability  effect".
A more direct  impact  on accountability  can  be  made through  the  use
of vouchers. People  who  deserve  special support  for  income  or other  reasons
can  now receive  subsidies  for  certain  services  while  choosing  the  service
providers  that  meet their  needs  most efficiently.  The  administration  of
vouchers  could  be  more  cumbersome  than  that  of grants  to the  service
providers. On the  other  hand,  vouchers  are  a superior  mode for  the  exercise
of exit in  comparison  to the  grant  system. In several  European  countries,
housing  vouchers  have  helped  improve  living  conditions  and  reduced  excessive
rent  burdens  by providing  low-income  renters  an option  to exit  substandard
public  housing. Chile  successfully  replaced  housing  subsidies  through  low
interest  rates  with the  more  direct  subsidized  method  of a voucher  program.
Under  this system,  beneficiaries  pay  for  the  value  of a specified  house  with
their  own savings,  the  voucher  and  a credit  obtained  from  commercial  banks  at
market  interest  rates. Initially  vouchers  did  not  work  well because  there  was
no private  supply  of  very low  cost  housing  and  because  the  commercial  banks
were not interested  in financing  low  income  earners. Eventually,  the
construction  industry  responded  as increased  financing  was  provided  by the
State  Bank  and  the  Ministry  of Hcusing. The  private  sector  has  now  become  so
active  and  specialized  in low  cost  housing  that  per  unit  costs  have  dropped.- 40 -
The  voucher  system  works  best  under  certain  conditions:
*  Individuals'  preferences  for  a  service  differ  significantly,  and
the  differences  are legitimate.
*  People  are  motivated  to shop  aggressively  for  the service.
*  Individuals  are  well informed  about  market  conditions,  including
the  cost  and  quantity  of the  service  and  where  it  can  be obtained.
Hany suppliers  of the  service  are  already  in  competition,  or find
it  a relatively  easy field  to enter.
*  The  quality  of the  service  is  easily  determined  by the  user.
*  The service  is relatively  inexpensive  and  is  purchased  frequently,
so  the  user  learns  by experience  (Allen  89).
High  Exit  - Strong  Voice
This  is the  simplest  case  of  all since  services  in this  cell rank
high  on  both exit  and  voice. To the  extent  that  some  of these  are  private
services,  the  options  to follow  are  fairly  self  evident.
Privatization  is  clearly  the  first  option  to explore. When the
potential  for  exit  and  voice  are  both  high,  market  competition  can  be expected
to  ensure  accountability.  Where  quasi  public  goods  are involved,  governments- 41 -
may  continue  to perform  a regulatory  role  (e.g.,  standard  setting,  quality
control,  etc.). For  example,  city  transport  may  be left  to competing  private
transport  operators,  but  under  the  watchful  eye  of a regulatory  body,  advisory
councils  involving  the  public,  etc.
Where  the  private  sector  is  not  adequately  developed,  there  may be
a case  for  the  public  sector  to continue  to play  a service  provider  role.
Instead  of outright  privatization,  public-private  competition  may then  be
encouraged.  For  example,  private  banks  may  be perm'.tted  to  compete  with
public  sector  banks. Both  public  and  privately  owned  airlines  may  coexist.
Both  privatization  and  public-private  competition  can  be expected
to ensure  accountability  through  the  exit  option. As Hirschman  points  out,
however,  services  which  entail  continuing  relations  between  the  public  and  the
providers  face  a unique  problem. The  public  are  unlikely  to  exit  without
first  attempting  to  use  their  voice  to improve  performance.  This  need  not
pose  any  difficulty  in  Cell  4 as the  public  involved  are  characterized  by
strong  voice.
Hierarchical  contrcl  within  public  agencies  and the  exit  and  voice
options  discussed  above  should  be mutually  reinforcing.  For  example,  the
internal  incentives  and  control  systems  and  practices  of service  providers(HC)
should  be congruent  with  what is  being  attempted  on the  exit  and  voice  fronts.
If  not, they  will  work at cross  purposes  and  weaken  public  accountabil..ty.  If
service  providers  do  not  have the  incentive  to improve  quality  as  indicated  by
the  feedback  from  a public  evaluation  or a  panel,  accountability  and
performance  will not  improve. The  commercial  nature  of some  services- 42 -
(utilities,  public  enterprises  with  priced  services,  etc.)  will  make it  easier
to use  financial  and  other  related  incentives  to  motivate  the  employees  of the
service  providers. The  primary  task  here is  to ensure  that  such  incentive  and
control  systems  are  consistent  with the  requirements  of accountability  to the
public.
V.  THE  PARADOX  OF CAPTURE
A comnon  feature  of the  two  right  hand cells  in  Diagram  III is
that  the  publics  involved  command strong  voice.' This  means  that  all  or some
of the  beneficiaries  of the  services  belong  to the  better  off  and  more
articulate  sections  of the  population.  The  options  to improve  accountability
analyzed  in Section  IV  highlight  a  variety  of  ways in  which  the  voice
mechanism  could  be used for  this  purpose. Furthermore,  services  in the  lower
right  hand cell  could  be  made to  perform  better  through  the  exit  option. One
would  expect  to see  in  leveloping  countries  nany  examples  of the  use  of voice
and  exit  in improving  the  services  depicted  in  the  different  cells. Yet the
reality  i9  that  such  examples  are  few  and  far  between. If  voice  is  not  being
used  to improve  public  service  accountability  in  Cells  2 and  4, and  exit  is
not  being  resorted  to in  Cells  3 and  4, it is reasonable  to conclude  that
service  performance  will remain  less  than  optimal. What accounts  for  this
paradox7
A  closer  look  at this  paradox  shows,  however,  that it  can  indeed
be explained  to a large  extent  by reference  to a set  of factors  that  exist  in
the  public  sectors  of  many  developing  countries. It is  reasonable  to
hypothesize  that  the  interactiona  among  these  factors,  as detailed  below,  is- 43 -
the  primary  explanation  of the  paradox.
(1)  The  population  with a strong  voice  who have  an interest  in
the  services  in the  right  hand  cells  of Diagram  III  includes politicians,
bureaucrats  and  other  influential  persons who  happen  to play  an active  role
in the  management  and  control  of the  same  services. They  need  not  be large  in
number  as long  as their  influence  is  considerable  and their  networks  strong.
They  are  members  of both  groups,  beneficiaries  and service  providers,  and  are
mutually  reinforcing.
(2) As a group,  they  have  a strong  disincentive  to use  exit  and
voice,  and  are  inclined  to  prevent  others  from  using  these  options. Exit
which  implies  the  existence  of  competition  can  disrupt  the wquiet  life,  of
service  providers  who are  part  of or linked  to this  interest  group. Voice
entails  a risk  for  the  users  in so far  as its  outcomes  are  uncertain. In
fact,  voice  may  well force  the  elite  group  to share  the  benefits  of a service
with the  rest  of the  public. It  is in the  interest  of the  group,  therefore,
to seek  alternative  ways to  maximize  its  share  of the  benefits.
(3)  The  group  referred  to above  is relatively  small  and  well
organized  in contrast  to  the  larger  public  of  which  they  are  a part.  It is
easier  for  them  to engage  in  effective  collective  action  than  for  the  public
at large  (Olsen  65).  Their  strong  voice,  their  joint  status  as beneficiaries
and  controllers  of services,  and  their  membership  of a compact  and organized
sub-group  seem  to give  them  the  capability,  opportunity  and  a strong  incentive
to capture  a disproportionate  share  of the services  (for  themselves)  and
possibly  also to  benefit  others closely  linked to them.  It is almost  as if- 44 -
they  are  well positioned  to appropriate  these  services  with  much less  effort
or cost  than  will be the  case  if they  had  to resort  to exit  or voice.  The
paradox  that is  evident  in  many countries  is  therefore  more apparent  than
real.
Examples  of the  paradox  of capture  abound  in developing  countries.
Governments  often  give  preferential  allocations  and  quotas  of scarce  services
(including  goods)  to  politicians,  bureaucrats  and  business.  Telephones,
housing,  permits  of various  types,  etc.,  illustrate  the  point.
*  In  one  country,  housing  development  boards(public  agencies)
have a priority  quota  for  civil  servants  that  limits  the  supply  available  to
the  public  at large.
*  In another  case,  all  higher  level  civil  servants  can  get  one
telephone  connection(  a highly  scarce  service)  on a  priority  basis  upon
retirement.
*  An electricity  board(  state  owned  enterprise)  provides
electricity  free  to  all its  employees  while  the  public  faces  power  cuts  and
rationing.
Sometimes,  informal  arrangements  and  contacts  are  used  to get
allocations  of scarce  items. Thus  queue  jumping  tends  to  be  widespread,  but
without  rousing  any  public  outcry  largely  because  of the  lack  of transparency
of procedures  (e.g.,  admission  to  quality  schools,  hospitals  or in the
allocation  of urban  land). If,  through  such  devices,  influential  segments  of- 45 -
the  public  are  able  to  capture  the  public  services  they require,  there  is  no
incentive  for  them  to resort  to the  more costly  exit  and  voice  options. Those
responsible  for  the  actual  service  delivery,  as shown  above,  may also  collude
in  this  process  as exit  would  be a threat  to their  quiet  life. This  then is
the  explanation  for  the  paradox  of scarce  and  often  poorly  performing  public
services  coexisting  with the  reluctance  of the  influential  publics  involved  to
make  use  of the  available  exit  and  voice  options  to improve  performance  for
all.
In  many  developing  countries,  the  phenomenon  of capture  is  a
dominant  barrier  to the  increased  use  of exit  and  voice  and  hence  to the
improvement  of accountability.  Capture  can  now  be added  to the  three  other
barriers,  listed  in Section  I,  namely,  governments'  monopoly  of  public
services,  the  public's  limited  capacity  and  willingness  to demand  service,  and
the  difficulties  in  measuring  and  quantifying  the  outputs  of services.
There  are  three  important  implications  of capture  for  public
service  accountability.  First,  capture  can  be considered  a case  of pseudo-
exit.  Since  the  elites  have  a  way out  of the  consequences  of the  poor
performance  of  public  services,  there  are  no internal  incentives  for  the
agencies  involved  to improve  their  accountability.  Genuine  principal-agent
relations  do  not exist  in this  setting. Collusion  between  the  two  will  be
pervasive  under  these  conditions.  Furthermore,  voice  of the  public  at large
is  usually  unequal  to the  task  of augmenting  public  service  accountability.
Second,  the  longer  the  paradox  of capture  persists,  the  greater
the  difficulties  in dismantling  it.  Over  the long  haul,  the  capture- 46 -
phenomenon  may  cause  performance  for  the  rest  of the  public  to decline  so  much
that  it sets  in  motion  strong  voice  mechanisms  (mass  protests,  political
upheavals). This  may  cause  major  reforms  of the  prevailing  regime  to  be
undertaken  leading  to a  distinct  improvement  of accountability.  The
implication  here is that  no perceptible  improvement  of performance  needs  to  be
expected  unless  and  until  a severe  crisis  erupts  (Olsen  85).  Increasing  the
supply  of services  is the  only  other  means  to  weaken  the incentives  for
capture.
Third,  continued  public  dissemination  of information  on public
service  performance  and  the  creation  of  greater  public  awareness  of these
issues  on a continuing  basis  can  be  used interim  to influence  accountability
if the  crisis  scenario  does  not  materialize. In the  final  analysis,  capture
can  be countered  only  by the  voice  of the  rest  of the  public. There  is some
evidence  that  this  approach  can indeed  lead  to improved  public  sector
performance  and  accountability.  For  example,  the  publication  of comparative
data  on infant  mortality  is said  to  have put  pressure  on some  governments
(obviously  poor  performers)  to  expand  and  improve  their  public  health
programs. The Indian  State  of Tamil  Nadu  was ranked  second  from  the  bottom
(compared  to  other  states)  in terms  of  nutrition  indicators  some  years  ago.
The  shock  of this  revelation  is said  to  have triggered  a  new and  successful
nutrition  program  in  this  state  which  today  has improved  its  position  to the
medium  range. Comparative  studies  of public  services  and  the  wide
dissemination  of their  findings  can,  thus,  help  mobilize  public  opinion  and
initiate  public  action. This  approach  promises  to  be a  useful  surrogate  for
competition  in the  public  sector.- 47 -
VI.  CONCLUSION
The  basic  argument  of this  paper  is that  public  accountability  is
an important  determinant  of ptiblic  service  performance  and that  its  impact  on
performance  can  be augmented  by mov'ng  away  from  an  exclusive  reliance  on HC
mechanisms  such  as  monitoring  and  use  of organizational  incencives  to a system
that  uses  exit  or voice  mechanisms  in  conjunction  with  HC.  Whether  the  public
will resort  to  exit  or voice  will depend  on uhe  relative  costs  associated  with
these  options  and  the  expected  value  to them  of the  performance  improvement
resulting  from  their  use  in a specific  context. The  costs  and  returns
associated  with exit  and  voice  will in  turn  be influenced  by the  degree  of
market  failure  underlying  the  services  in question.
Exit  and  voice  can  be expected  to impact  accountability  both
directly  and  indirectly.  The  contestability  effect  of some  of the  exit  and
voice  mechanisms  can  have a  direct  effect  on the  behavior  of service
providers. Through  their  impact  on HC  mechanisms,  they  can  also  have  an
indirect  and  positiie  effect  on the  same  set  of agents  by keeping  them win
line'. The  nature  and  extent  of this  impact  will  depend  on the  relative
bargaining  power  of the  multiple  stakeholders  vis-a-vis  the  agents  involved.
The  factors  that  influence  the  potential  for  exit  and  voice  in the
context  of different  public  services  are  several. The  key characteristics  on
the  exit  side  are the  presence  of  economies  of scale  (monopoly),  legal
barriers  to  entry,  and  spatial  barriers  to  exit.  Voice  potential  is
determined  by legal,  informational  and  institutional  barriers,  the  public's
level  of income  and  education  (and  hence  political  power),  the  relative- 48 -
importance  of the  service  to the  public,  and  service  differentiability.  Some
of these  are  natural  barriers  and  characteristics  whereas  others  are
artificial  or policy  induced. Economies  of scale,  spatial  barriers,  the
relative  importance  of services,  and  differentiability  are  natural  factors.
Legal,  informational  and  institutional  barriers,  and income  and  education
characteristics  (to  a large  extent),  are  policy  induced  factors. Public
services  can  be categorized  in terms  of the  exit  and  voice  potential  they
afford  the  public  by reference  to these  barriers  and  characteristics.  An
analysis  of the  features  and  barriers  of public  services  and  of the  publics
involved  can  be used to  predict  the  potential  for  the  use  of exit  and  voice  in
specific  service  contexts. This  analysis  along  with the  knowledge  of the
extent  to  which  such  features/barriers  are  natural  or  policy  induced  provide  a
basis  for  the  design  of new  mechanisms  for  public  accountability  and improved
service  performance.
A useful  approach  to  the  improvement  of accountability  is to
devise  ways and  means  to overcome  these  barriers  or to  minimize  the  adverse
effects  of these  characteristics.  Clearly,  natural  factors  are  more difficult
to overcome  than  those  induced  by policy. Exit  and  voice  potential  can
therefore  be more  easily  realized  by first  eliminating  the  policy  induced
barriers. Minimizing  the  adverse  effects  of  natural  barriers  will call  for
more time,  effort  and resources.  Judged  by these  criteria,  services
characterized  by  weak  voice  and low  exit  will  be the  most difficult  to deal
with.  Natural  factors  play a  dominant  role  in  causing  this  combination  of
exit  and  voice. The  implications  of this  analysis  can  be seen  in the  menu of
options  for  improving  accountability  for  services  that  fall  under  the
different  combinations  of exit  and  voice  potential  discussed  in Section  IV.  A- 49 -
menu of  option.  that fit.  the  problems  of the  different  exit-voice
combinations  is  a  more useful  approach  to  the  improvement  of  public  service
accountability  than  one  that  offers  a standard  answer  for  all  situations.  The
set  of  propositions  summarized  below  can  be a guide  to the  choice  of options:
1. When a public  service  is  characterized  by limited  exit  and
voice  potential  for  a population  that  comprises  the  poor(often  rural  or
isolated  groups  of people),  improved  accountability  is achieved  more
effectively  through  the  use  of  voice  than  of exit.
2.  When  there  is  limited  exit  potential  for  the  public  in the
context  of  a service  that  cannot  be differentiated  and  the  public  or a segment
of it  has strong  voice,  voice  is the  primary means  to improve  public
accountability.
3.  Voice  is strengthened  primarily  through  the  medium  of external
intervention  under  the  conditions  described  in (1)  above,  whereas  the  use  of
voice  occurs  through  the  public's  own  initiative  under  the  conditions
described  in (2)  above.
4. When a service  offers  exit  potential,  but the  public  has low
voice  potential,  exit is  a  more effective  means  to  augment  accountability  than
voice.
5.  When a service  is  characterized  by 'product  involvement,  and
offers  potential  for  both exit  and  voice,accountability  is  augmented  through  a
combination  of exit  and  voice  mechanisms.- 50  -
The  phenomenon  of capture  is  an important  barrier  to the
improvement  of accountability  in  developing  countries. Capture,  along  with
government  monopoly  of  many public  services,  the  limited  capacity  of the
public  to demand  and  monitor  good  performance,  and  the  problems  in  measuring
and  quantifying  the  benefits  of services,  make  the  improvement  of  public
service  accountability  an especially  complex  and  difficult  undertaking.
What  can  be done  to enhance  public  service  accountability  in
developing  countries  in the  medium  term?  First  of all,  even  when the
phenomenon  of capture  or other  problems  severely  limit  the scope  for
significant  reform,  there  is  a case  for  mobilizing  public  opinion  for  change
through  the  dissemination  of information  on the  performance  of public
services. Public  surveys  of client  satisfaction,  public  evaluations  of
service  providers,  comparative  analysis  of performance  indicators  within
countries  and  across  countries  can  be used  to lay  the  foundation  for  a ground
swell  in favor  of reform. The  Tamil  Nadu  example  of the  origin  of a nutrition
program  referred  to earlier  illustrates  how influential  information  could  be
in  changing  public  opinion  and  policy  makers'  perspectives.  This  is certainly
an area in  which  the  World  Bank  and  other  international  donors  can  play  a
catalytic  role.
Second,  there  is  a need  to correct  the  imbalance  that  has
developed  among  the  stakeholders  of public  services. In  many developing
countries,  the  mandates  and  behavior  of service  providers  are  dominated  by
their  own  preferences  or the  priorities  of their  supervisors  and influential
elite  groups. The  weakest  stakeholder  is the  public  or its  segments  who do
not  have an adequate  'voice'  for  the  reasons  discussed  in this  paper.  It is- 51 -
important  to examine  the  kinds  of  exit  and  voice  mechanisms  that  can  be
mustered  to  correct  this  imbalance. Since  the  costs  and  benefits  of the
different  options  tend  to  vary  a great  deal,  there  is  merit  in assessing  the
experiences  of different  countries  in this  regard  . Innovations  in the  design
of improved  accountability  systems  must  be informed  by the international
evidence  on the  ground.
Third,  the  HC  mechanisma  being  used  by service  providers
(monitoring  and incentive  systems)  must be checked  for  their  compatibility
with  the  expectations  of the  stakeholders  and  the  trade  offs  that  have  been
worked  out  between  them.  The  spectrum  of performance  dimensions  (inputs,
access  and  quality)  discussed  in the  paper  provides  a useful  basis  for  this
check. If,  for  example,  quality  or access  attributes  are  missing,  and
incentives  are  not in  place  to  motivate  service  providers  to  pursue  these
dimensions  of performance,  the  corrective  action  required  is to  deploy  exit  or
voice  mechanisms  or a combination  of the  two  so as to get  the  service
providers  to  be more responsive  or  accountable  to the  stakeholders.  In
developing  countries  where  poverty  reduction  is  a  major  goal,  correcting  the
imbalance  among  stakeholders  in favor  of the  poor  and  towards  access  and
quality  as  performance  dimensions  merit  special  attention.- 52  -
REFERENCES
Allen,  J.  W., et.  al.,  The  Private  Sector  in State  Service  Delivery:  Examples
of Innovative  Practices,  The  Urban  Institute  Press,  Washington,  D. C.,
1989.
Becker,  G., 'Competition  Among  Pressure  Groups  for  Political  Influence,'
Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  August  1983.
Bos,  D.,  Public  Enterprise  Economics:  Theory  and  Applications,  North-Holland,
Amsterdam,  1986.
Bruenan,  G. and  Buchanan,  J.,  The  Reasons  for  Rules,  Universety  of  Chicago
Press,  Chicago,  Illinois,  1985.
Buchanan,  J.,  Tollison,  R. D.,  and  Tullock  (eds),  Towards  a Theory  of Rent
Seeking  Society,  A & M University  Press,  Texas,  1980.
Colander,  D. C. (ed),  Neoclassical  Political  Economy:  An Analysis  of Rent
Seeking  and  DUP  Activity,  Ballinger,  Cambridge,  MA, 1984.
Eaves,  Paige,  Accountability  in  Public  Services: A Review  of the  Literature,
mimeo,  CECPS,  1990.
Esman,  M. and  Uphoff,  N.,  Local  Organizations:  Intermediaries  for  Rural
Development,  Cornell  University  Press,  Ithaca,  N. Y., 1984.
Fama,  E. F. and  Jensen,  M. C., 'Separation  of  Ownership  and  Control,'  Journal
of Law  and  Economics,  1983.
Feldstein,  M. (ed),  Handbook  of Public  Economics,  North-Holland,  Amsterdam,
1985.
Galal,  A., Institutional  Framework  for  Efficient  and  Sustainable  Restructuring
of State-Owned  Enterprises,  1989.
Hardin,  R.,  Collection  Action,  Resources  for  the  Future,  Washington,  D. C.,
1982.
Hartmark,  Lief,  'Accountability,  Efficiency,  and  Effectiveness  in the  State
University  of New  York,'  SUNY-Albany:  Comparative  Development  StudLes
Center,  1975.
Hatry,  Harry  et al.,  How  tffective  Are  Your  Coinunity  Services?,  The
Urban  Institute,  Washington,  D.C..  1977.
Heald,  D., 'Performance  Measurements  in Public  Enterprises,'  in  M. Neuman  and
K. Roskamp  (eds.),  Public  Finance  and  Performance  of Enterprises,
Detroit,  1989.Hirschman,  A., Exit,  Voice  and  Loyalty,  Harvard  University  Press,  Cambridge,
MA, 1970.
Howenstine,  E.,  Housing  Vouchers:  A  Comparative  International  Analysis,  Center
for  Urban  Policy  Research,  New  Jersey,  1986.
Jabbra,  J. G. and  Dwivedi,  0. P. (eds.),  Public  Service  Accountability:  A
Comparative  Perspective,  Kumarian  Press,  Hartford,  CT,  1989.
Kanter,  R.  M. and  Summers,  'Doing  Well  While  Doing  Good:  Dilemmas  of
Performance  in  Non-Profit  Organizations  and  the  Need  for  a
Multi-Constituency  Approach, in Powell,  The  Non-Profit  Sector,  Yale
University  Press,  New  Haven,  1986.
Levy,  B.,  A Theory  of Public  Enterprise  Behavior,*  Journal  of Economic
Behavior  and  Organization,  1987.
Nellis,  John,  Contract  Plans  and  Public  Enterprise  Performance,  PRE  Working
Paper,  World  Bank,  1988.
Niskanen,  W.,  Bureaucracy  and  Representative  Government,  Aldine,  1971.
OECD,  A Survey  of Initiatives  for  Improving  Relationships  Between  the  Citizen
and  the  Administration,  Public  Management  Studies  Series  I  1,  Paris,
1987.
OECD,  Administration  as Service,  The  Public  as Client,  Paris,  1987.
Olson,  M., The  Logic  of  Collective  Action,  Harvard  University  Press,
Cambridge,  HA, 1965.
Olson,  M., The  Growth  and  Decline  of Nations,  Yale  University  Press,  Hartford,
CT,  1985.
Paul,  S.,  Community  Participation  in  Development  Projects:  The  World  Bank
Experience,  Discussion  Paper  No.  6,  World  Bank,  Washington,  D. C.,  1987.
Premchand,  A.,  Government  Budgeting  and  Expenditure  Controls,  IMF,  1983.
Ramanathan,  K. V.,  Management  Control  in  Non-Profit  Organizations,  Wiley,  New
York,  1982.
Rose-Ackerman,  Susan,  'Reforming  Public  Bureaucracy  through  Economic
Incentives,"  Journal  of  Law,  Economics,  and  Organization,  1986.
Smookler,  H.  V., 'Accountability  of Public  Officials  in  the  U. S.,'  in  Jabbrs
and  Dwivedi  (eds.),  Public  Service  Accountability:  A Comparative
Perspective,  Kumarian  Press,  Hartford,  CT.,  1989.
Stanyer,  J. and  Smith,  B.  C.,  Administering  Britain,  Font"na,  London,  1976.Tirole,  J., "Hierarchies  and  Bureaucraciess  On the  Role  of Collusion  in
Organizations,"  Journal  of Law,  Economics  and  Organization,  1986.
Tullock,  The  Politics  of Bureaucracy,  Public  Affairs  Press,  Washington,  D.C.,
1965.
Wade,  R.,  Village  Republics,  Cambridge  University  Press,  Cambridge,  1988.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
an  A  uto  for papa
WPS596  The  Mexican  Sugar  Industry:  Brent  Borrell  February  1991  P. Kokila
Problems  and Prospects  33716
WPS59?  Rent  Sharing  in the Multi-Fibre  Refik  Erzan  February  1991  G. llogon
Arrangement:  Theory  and  Evidence  Kala  Krishna  33732
from U.S.  Appoel lmports  from  Ling  Hul  Tan
Hong  Kong
WPS598 Africa Region  Population  Projections:  Patience  W.  Stephens  February  1991  0. Nadora
1990-91  Edition  Eduard  Bos  31091
My  T. Vu
RodoHfo  A. Bulatao
WPS599  Asia  Region  Population  Projections:  Eduard  Bos  February  1991  0. Nadora
1990-91  Edition  Patience  W. Stephens  31091
My  T. Vu
Rodolfo  A. Bulatao
WPS600  Latin  America  and  the Caribbean  My  T. Vu  February  1991  0. Nadora
Region  Population  Projections:  Eduard  Bos  31091
1990-91  Edition  Patience  W.  Stephens
Rodolfo  A. Bulatao
WPS601  Europe,  Middle  East,  and  North  Eduard  Bos  February  1991  0. Nado a
Africa  Region  Population  Projections:  Patience  W.  Stephens  31091
1990-91  Edition  My  T. Vu
Rodolfo  A. Bulatao
WPS602  Firm  Output  Adjustment  to Trade  Mark  A. Dutz  February  1991  S. Fallon
Liberalization:  Theory  with  38009
Application  to the Moroccan
Experience
WPS603  The  Role  of Officially  Supported  Asli Demirgu,-Kunt  February  1991  G. Ilogon
Export  Credits  in Sub-Saharan  Relik  Erzan  33732
Africa's  External  Financing
WPS604  Foreign  Trade  and  Its  Relation  to  Faezeh  Foroutan  February  1991  S. Fallon
Competition  and Productivity  in  37942
Turkish Ir.ustry
WPS605  Overview  of Contractual  Savings  Dimitri  Vittas  March  1991  W. Pitayato-
Savings Institutions  Michael  Skully  nakarn
37666
WPS606  Adjustment  Policies  and Investment  Luis  Serven  March  1991  E. Khine
Performance  in Developing  Andr6s  Solimano  39361
Countries: Theory,  Country  Experiences,
and Policy  ImplicationsPRE  Working  Paar  Series
Contact
eAutbr  forage
WPS607  Abolishing  Green  Rates: The Effects Donald  F. Larson  March  1991  D. Gustalson
on Cereals,  Sugar,  and  Oilseeds  Simon  Glance  33714
in West  Germany  Brent  Borrell
Merlinda  Ingco
Jonathan  Coleman
WPS608  Cross-Country  Studies  of Growth  Ross  Levine  March  1991  CECMG
and Policy: Methodological,  David  Reneft  39175
Concepual,  and Statistical  Problems
WPS609  A Sensitivity  Analysis  of Cross-  Ross  Levine  March  1991  CECMG
Country  Growth  Regressions  David  Renelt  39175
WPS610  Can  Preshipment  Inspection  Offset  Alexander  J. Yeats  March  1991  J. Jacobson
Noncompetitive  Pricing  of Developing  33710
Countries'  Imports?  The  Evidence
from Madagascar
WPS611  Tariffl-based  Commodity  Price  Jonathan  R. Coleman  March  1991  S. Lipscomb
Stabilization  Schemes  in Venezuela  Donald  F. Larson  33718
WPS612  Education  and Productivity  in  Lawrence  J. Lau  March  1991  WDR  Office
Developing  Countries:  An Aggregate Dean  T. Jamison  31393
Production  Function  Approach  Frederic  F. Louat
WPS613  Price-Wage  Dynamics  and  the  Simon  Commander  March  1991  0. Del  Cid
Transmission  of Inflation  in Socialist  Fabrizio  Coricelli  39050
Economies:  Empirical  Models  for
Hungary  and  Poland
WPS614  Accountability  in Public  Services:  Samuel  Paul  March  1991  E.  Madrona
Exit,  Voice,  and  Capture  37496
WPS615  Socialist  Economic  Growth  and  Heng-tu  Zou  March  1991  A. Bhalla
Political  Investment  Cycles  37699